Надеюсь, перевод сделаем достаточно быстро.
Кстати, к вопросу о номинализме и понимании учения об универсалиях:
That is to say, Eustratios here recognizes that an eidos can be understood either as a species, or as a form common to many perceptible individuals, or finally as the form in a specific individual. In fact, this latter sense of an eidos is what Italos identifies as the universal in the particulars and what the Stoics and Porphyry (7,19-27) call 'a proper quality' (idia poiotes) or 'proper feature' (id-iotes)25; for Eustratios seems to understand these eide as nothing other than the perceptible individuals themselves with their proper characteristics26. Hence, when Eustratios draws a distinction between gene and eide as having different ontological status, he thinks of eide not as species, because eide as species are, just like gene, mere concepts or thoughts which do not subsist. On the other hand, both an eidos which is understood as a form common to many perceptible individuals and an eidos which is understood as the form in a specific individual are said to subsist insofar as they subsist in the perceptible individuals.
The difference in the ontological status between gene and eide in the sense of forms is, I suggest, the key to understanding and to resolving the disagreement between the modern interpretations of Eustratios' theory of universals. For those who have treated him as a nominalist have clearly focused on texts in which Eustratios defends his view that gene and eide, understood as species, are nothing but bare concepts stripped of all reality. Those who have presented him, on the other hand, as a moderate or conceptual realist have underlined passages of Eustratios' commentaries in which the term 'eide' either refers to forms common to many perceptible individuals or to forms as they subsist in and are constitutive of an individual. On my view, however, Eustratios believes that, apart from God's thoughts, only individuals exist; gene and eide, understood as species or as forms, are concepts or thoughts which either do not subsist or solely subsist in perceptible individuals. Against Plato, therefore, he would object that eide do not have separate existence outside the divine mind, while against Aristode he would object that gene and eide, understood as species, are not even secondary substances. In fact, Eustratios uses every chance to stress, in his commentaries as well as in his theological treatises, that God's thoughts and the particulars are substances (kupostaseis) and exist per se (kath' eautou), whereas what the human mind acquires by abstraction from the common characteristics of perceptible individuals either merely subsists or does not even subsist (cfr. Refutation 164,12-23; 165,3-10) (P. 76 - 77).
Надеюсь, понятно, что отождествление прп. Иоанном Дамаскиным сущности, вида и формы значит несколько больше, чем нашим патрологам, не обращающим на сей факт никакого внимания, представляется :)